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Introduction
Immediately after the formation of the Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition government the Gaddafi regime's response to pro-democracy demonstrations was particularly interesting in the context of the SDSR, in that it seemed to go against the core logic underpinning the review. To have ruled out -as the SDSR did -air-cover via aircraft carriers until 2015 at the earliest, airborne intelligence cover altogether, and a critical mass of capability required for such operations, but then be at the forefront (along with France) of the international commitment to a military response seemed confused. The government's response also provided ample opportunity for opponents of the SDSR to highlight the strategic inadequacies within the government's approach and focused attention on the far from straightforward question of what, in practice, 'strategy' actually means and requires. 4 It is in this context that this article examines the politics and strategic direction of the SDSR. 5 We assess the extent to which the SDSR was a 'strategic' defence review, and we argue -as our title implies -that the SDSR has been fatally undermined by the decision to intervene in Libya. 6 We argue that the Libya policy highlights the critical disjuncture between the strategic intent underpinning the response to the Libyan crisis and the fiscally-led nature of an SDSR driven by the Cabinet Office and Treasury without an explicit understanding (nor the ability to articulate it) of its relationship to political understandings of the UK's wider strategic interests.
From SDR to SDSR
The October 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review, Securing Britain in an Age of Uncertainty, was the first substantial United Kingdom (UK) defence review in over a decade, and represented the first time that strategy regarding defence, security and intelligence had been formally integrated into a single review. The previous defence review, New Labour's 1998 Strategic Defence Review 7 , had established the broad strategic direction of defence for the following decade, with just one updating strategy document, the Delivering Security in a 4 For excellent discussions about British strategy see, for example, Patrick Porter, Why Britain Doesn't Do Changing World White Paper, being published thereafter, in December 2003. 8 The purpose behind the October 2010 SDSR was to set out the practical direction of defence policy in the light of a strategic assessment that would inform the period of Conservative or coalition government to come in the same way that the 1998 SDR had defined New Labour's era in defence policy.
As the 2003 White Paper noted, the 1998 SDR had represented, "a fundamental rethink of how the Armed Forces and their supporting infrastructure should be structured to face the challenges of the increasingly complex security environment which followed the ending of the Cold War and the emergence of uncertainty and instability in many areas of the world." 9 To this end, the conclusion of the SDR had been that the UK needed 'modern' armed forcesi.e. forces "equipped and supported for rapid and sustainable deployment in expeditionary operations, usually as part of a coalition." 10 By the time of the 2003 White Paper this capacity had been tested in the Balkans, Sierra Leone, Afghanistan and Iraq, bringing to the fore questions about military over-stretch. At the same time, though, the Western response to the events of 9/11 and the decision to invade Iraq had contributed to an international security environment characterised by even greater uncertainty than had characterised the post-Cold
War environment of 1997-98, with the potential consequence that the UK's armed forces faced "an even broader range, frequency, and often duration of tasks". 11 In this context, the White Paper concluded that:
The breadth of the tasks [the Armed Forces] will be required to undertake, from peacekeeping humanitarian support and confidence building operations through to counter-terrorist and large-scale combat operations, demand that our forces be flexible and responsive, multi-roled and able to reconfigure to achieve the desired outcome. In taking forward effects-based planning and operations, our focus will move away from simple calculations of platform numbers to developing network enabled capabilities designed to achieve a range of strategic effects. A new range of equipment and systems entering service over the coming years will greatly enhance capability and ensure that UK forces remain amongst the finest in the world.
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The origins of many of the problems confronted via the SDSR are to be found in the SDR.
Expensive equipment procurement decisions (like the aircraft carriers) were highlighted in the SDR, but only resolved in the dying days of the Brown Labour government. 13 Similarly, decisions regarding armoured troop moving vehicles (the 'snatch Land Rover'/IED debate and Future Rapid Effect System -FRES) were botched or avoided during most of the New Labour 2000s, resulting in both anguish to service families and large cost over-runs and false starts (to the tune of £188m) in trying to sort these problems out in a hurried manner. At the same time, the absence of a thorough overhaul of defence management meant that the problem of the MoD's inflexibility and unresponsiveness in the face of changing operational and commercial demands was never resolved.
The defence challenges facing the newly-elected coalition government were set out in a January 2010 pre-election Conservative Party document, A Resilient Nation. 14 The economic tension involved in continuing to play a lead international role in meeting the wide range of uncertainties set out in the 2003 White Paper is clearly evident in this document. It warned that the SDSR it would undertake if elected; "will need to be forward-looking and face up to some very tough decisions that have been put off for too long. Equipment programmes cannot be based on wish-lists or the fantasy world of what we would like to do if resources were unlimited." 15 Logically, this would also have implications for the automaticity with which the UK Armed Forces were committed to conflict situations, as policies and priorities were in future determined in the light of available resources. Hence, the SDSR would; "need to harness our national strengths -our willingness to play a part far beyond our borders, strong public support for our Armed Forces, the character of our fighting men and women, the strength of our defence industry and technologies -to an overall strategy which makes the most effective use of them rather than putting them in a state of permanent overstretch…That means calibrating our role and our capabilities to the sort of conflicts period of reflection was probably needed on defence and security policy, akin to that which preceded the 1998 SDR (a review which took over a year to complete), the coalition government's prioritisation of rapid deficit reduction in effect outweighed all other considerations. 22 Officials within the MoD, who were close to the SDSR process, described the SDSR as the best of all possible reviews in the circumstances, the clear implication being
that the focus of analysis should be on the factors that framed the review, rather than on the review itself.
23
The 2010 National Security Strategy
The SDSR was designed to be umbilically linked to the coalition government's National month later Blair was reassuring the same backbenchers that, "it was nonsense to talk about overstretch. We would be sending about a thousand troops for a maximum of three or four months and then someone else would take over."
29
However, precisely what was meant by 'strategy', and hence the purpose of a NSS, was less straightforward than recognising the need for one. The PASC report identified a deficit in strategic thinking in the UK to the extent that the country had lost the habit of undertaking it. 30 One consequence of this, itself in part a consequence of the contemporary ubiquity of the term, was that 'strategy' and 'policy' were often confused -or, at least, the distinction between the two was not fully understood (a trap into which the PASC considered the Foreign Secretary, William Hague, to have fallen 31 ). In giving evidence, Hew Strachan (who chaired the government's working group on the military covenant) offered the view that; "the relationship is an interactive one. In theoretical terms…the implication is that strategy flows from policy and in an ideal world that would be the case. But, in reality, there's not much chance of implementing your policy if it's strategically unsound and impossible to fulfil, so there is likely to be a much more dynamic relationship between the two." 32 In an effort to bring some clarity to discussion of strategy, the PASC offered a definition of strategy as being; "about dealing with uncertainty, complexity and the dynamic. It is not a plan or a paper. In modern politics it is about ensuring that the whole of government identifies and acts upon the national interest. In order to protect our interests at home, we must project our influence abroad. As the global balance of power shifts, it will become harder for us to do so. But we should be under no illusion that our national interest requires our continued full and active engagement in world affairs. It requires our economy to compete with the strongest and the best and our entire government effort overseas must be geared to promote our trade, the lifeblood of our economy. But our international role extends beyond the commercial balance sheet, vital though it is. Our national interest requires us to stand up for the values our country believes in -the rule of law, democracy, free speech, tolerance and human rights. Those are the attributes for which Britain is admired in the world and we must continue to advance them, because Britain will be safer if our values are upheld and respected in the world.
To do so requires us to project power and to use our unique network of alliances and relationships -principally with the United States of America, but also as a member of the European Union and NATO, and a permanent member of the UN Security Council.
We must also maintain the capability to act well beyond our shores and work with our allies to have a strategic presence wherever we need it.
35
On this basis, UK grand strategy might reasonably be interpreted as being designed to maintain and, where possible, enhance relative influence in these relationships and organisations, both via diplomacy and via an ability and willingness to deploy military force in support of shared goals. This is akin to the notion commonly used in EU studies of 'preferences' and 'policies', where government preferences are stable over a considerable amount of time -for example, the UK's strongly transatlantic disposition -and its policies are the short-term developments that give expression to the preferences. 36 It is by being able to do the third of the things set out above (project power) that the first is achieved and the chances of achieving the second are greatly improved -so long as power is projected judiciously. In the NSS this strategic vision was boiled down to a definition of the UK NSS as being; "to use all our national capabilities to build Britain's prosperity, extend our nation's influence in the world and strengthen our security." 37 These then were the ends, albeit presented in the language of a corporate mission statement. As the NSS recognised: "A national security strategy, like any strategy, must be a combination of ends (what we are seeking to achieve), ways (the ways by which we seek to achieve those ends) and means (the resources we can devote to achieving the ends)." 38 The purpose of the SDSR was to move beyond this level of generalisation and identify ways and means -to outline how these ends would be realised, and the configuration of resources necessary to this realisation, in the context of an analysis of both the actually existing security environment and future possible threats.
To this end, the NSS indicated that the SDSR would set out how the coalition government would "sort out the mess we inherited" in order:
• to ensure our forces in Afghanistan have the equipment they need;
• to begin to bring the defence programme back into balance; and
• to enable Britain to retain the best and most versatile Armed Forces in the worldbetter equipped to protect our security in an age of uncertainty.
39
However, there was an obvious tension here between the second and third aims. This extended to a tension between the opening statement of the NSS, that the government had "given national security the highest priority" and the later statement that the government's "most urgent task is to return our nation's finances to a sustainable footing and bring sense to the profligacy and lack of planning that we inherited." 40 Given the limited reference to economic security as a strategic goal in the SDSR, and the clear governmental prioritisation of a rapid reduction in the national deficit -more rapid than that advocated by other political parties during the 2010 general election campaign -this seemed to suggest less a pangovernmental strategic approach and more the traditional British approach to departmental budget-setting. 41 Moreover, the circumscribed timescale for the SDSR had itself been determined by the government's requirement that it be concluded in parallel with the into which other states and non-state actors could also be drawn. 45 The range of threatsespecially in the second and third tiers -together with the financial environment resulted in an emphasis on the importance of conflict prevention, and a highlighting of the importance of being able to identify risks at an early stage and so prevent them from developing into threats.
As a consequence the government decided to focus all development aid on furthering British currently under review in the MoD, with the key debates being around whether the post is in uniform (as had always been the case) or as a civil servant.
The Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR)
The risks identified as Tier One via the NSS would determine the prioritisation of capabilities, which were set out in the SDSR -the balancing of ends, ways and means. How effectively the SDSR did this, and how far capabilities were driven by economic rather than strategic factors, is a question that came to dominate discussion of the SDSR, especially in light of the intervention in Libya.
In terms of force deployment, the SDSR set out a vision whereby in future the UK would be able to simultaneously conduct: one enduring stabilisation operation at brigade level (up to 6,500 personnel with maritime and air support (similar to, but at a lower level to, the 2010
Afghanistan commitment); one non-enduring complex intervention (of up to 2,000 personnel); and one non-enduring simple operation (of up to 1,000 personnel). Alternatively, it provided for three concurrent non-enduring operations (assuming no simultaneous enduring commitment -e.g. that UK troops had left Afghanistan by that point), or for a larger single intervention of up to three brigades with maritime and air support (at approximately 30,000
personnel, around two-thirds the number deployed to Iraq in 2003).
47
Another dimension of the 'means' part of the strategic equation related to procurement decisions which would facilitate such operations. To this end, the SDSR announced the immediate cancellation of the Nimrod MRA4 programme (a costly proposition given that it had not come into service, but was due to do so imminently), and the withdrawal of British forces from Germany by 2020 (contrary to popular belief, unlikely to generate savings for the can manage without the carrier. We need aircraft, but we know we can deliver aircraft from land-based options, such as airfields. With this tacitly parked to one side, except for the question of adequacy of equipment -in the past (for the Conservatives) and in the future (for Labour), the focus of party political debate was on the nature of the proposed cuts and hence just how 'strategic' the SDSR actually was. It also involved the securitisation of the economy to an extent not trailed in the NSS, as in Liam Fox's contention that: "If we learned anything from the cold war, it is that a strong economy equals strong defence. The economic legacy of the previous Government is a national security liability. We were left with a situation in which the country's finances were wrecked while the world is a more dangerous place than at any time in recent memory."
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This led on to the presentation of the SDSR as involving two stages, the first (2010-2015)
which involved difficult choices whilst the legacy of the Labour government was dealt with, and the second (2015-2020) which would be "about regrowing capability and achieving our overall vision." 62 Parliamentary opposition from the Labour benches was essentially limited to protests and lobbying relating to the implications for employment in particular constituencies. Indeed, some of the most effective questioning came from the Conservative benches -particularly the chairs of the Defence and Public Administration committeesJames Arbuthnot and Bernard Jenkin respectively. Arbuthnot in particular occupied an interesting position in relation to the debate -Chair of a relatively powerful select committee whose business was defence, which had already published a report critical of the SDSR process, and in a climate in which the majority party governed from a position of relative weakness, being required to sustain a coalition with a party to which it had displayed a clear antipathy in that year's general election campaign if it was to continue governing with an overall parliamentary majority. Having described the SDSR process as "pretty much rubbish"
and offered the view that the, "haste of this review meant that an opportunity to consult the wider public, defence academics, the defence industry and Parliament was missed", 63 he understood the SDSR in domestic political rather than solely strategic terms, explaining that:
My greatest concern about defence is that the British, and perhaps the European, public believe that defence is a job done and that the end of the cold war meant the end of the need to spend serious amounts of money on defending our interests. They think we can rely on the Americans to protect us, but they are wrong: the Americans will protect us only for as long as it is in their interests to do so. Until our constituents demand that we spend more on defence, no Chancellor of the Exchequer will wish to do so, but that will not happen until the public are properly engaged in talking about defence or until they understand its importance and purpose. If one conducts a defence review behind closed doors, while everyone is away on holiday and at a pace that would startle Michael Schumacher, no such understanding will arise.
64

Lost Over Libya
The core tensions between the SDSR and the UK's strategic posture were given even greater salience by events in Libya in early 2011. Did the vision outlined in the SDSR suggest that Britain would play the prominent role it did in relation to Libya, or did the intervention over Libya represent a deviation from that vision? What role did Britain aspire to play within the formal and informal international security architecture. This question is particularly pertinent to an era when the concept of failed or failing states and an emphasis on preventive interventions have combined to create an environment in which wars of choice rather than necessity are a key feature of security debates. In this environment, the extent to which the government views the UK as playing a lead role, or a supportive role, in these debates and interventions is a key strategic question. By no means all future scenarios arising from these considerations will represent a direct or discernible challenge to UK national security.
While the NSS did contain a reference to "occasions when it is in our interests to take part in We understand that idealism in foreign policy always needs to be tempered with realism. We have a liberal-conservative outlook that says that change, however desirable, can rarely be imposed on other countries, and that our ability to do so is likely to diminish with time. We know that we have to promote our values with conviction and determination but in ways that are suited to the grain of the other societies we are dealing with, particularly in fragile or post-conflict states…
Democracy cannot be imposed on other countries by ditkat or design. It was one of the many illusions of Communism that societies can be designed in the abstract and restarted at year zero. They cannot. Our own experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan should also teach us modesty in this regard…We should never turn a blind eye to countries which display the trappings of democracy while violating basic human rights, or that lay claim to the rule of law while lacking the independent courts and proper systems of accountability and transparency to prevent abuses of state power.
But we do not have the option, unlike Gladstone or Palmerston, of dispatching gunboats and relying on the power of the British Empire.
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Moreover, the entire emphasis in the NSS and SDSR on investing in conflict prevention was widely understood as being based on the fact that this was less costly than intervention, and that intervention would become increasingly rare for a combination of ideological and economic reasons. The logic of this view was that the threshold triggering a future humanitarian or other military intervention by the UK would be raised, and hence its occurrence would be far less frequent. Indeed, the SDSR explained that;
we will be more selective in our use of the Armed Forces, deploying them decisively at the right time but only where key UK national interests are at stake; where we have a clear strategic aim; where the likely political, economic and human costs are in proportion to the likely benefits; where we have a viable exit strategy; and where justifiable under international law.
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In presenting the SDSR to Parliament, Cameron had emphasised the difference between it and previous reviews, one of which was the shift "from a strategy that is over-reliant on military intervention to a higher priority for conflict prevention. Cameron's strategic vision as revealed over Libya, HMS Cumberland was diverted to the Mediterranean to take part in the operation whilst on its way back to the UK to be scrapped.
Stanhope also expressed concern that, as a consequence of the SDSR, maintaining naval operations around Libya at the level of May-June 2011 would require "some challenging decisions about priorities" if the conflict dragged on over the summer. 70 Cameron's Libya commitment was a product of a strategic sense of Britain's role in the world that was absent as an identified driver of the SDSR, and was also absent from his own statements in presenting or explaining the SDSR. national interest designed to reassure the military, parliament and public that the forthcoming defence cuts were strategic rather than simply Treasury-led. The suspicion that they were not strategic was clearly articulated by the PASC and Defence Committee and their respective chairs throughout the SDSR process, and is reinforced by the case of Libya. Thirdly, that the Libya intervention was consistent with the strategy underpinning the SDSR given that it places such importance in the maintenance of the 'special relationship' with the US, as a consequence of which the government has a vested interest in making NATO clearly relevant in the 21 st century. On this reading, apparently stepping outside the logic of the SDSR was consistent with the logic of the SDSR. This may have been the intent, but the performance of NATO without a US military lead, and perceptions of the commitment and capacities of individual member states, has served to raise questions about its future utility for the US rather than cement any US commitment to it. 71 Ultimately, then, the SDSR may well contribute to a weakening of NATO -undermining rather than securing its own strategic goals. Hence, even on this reading, in its inability to balance ends, ways and means, the SDSR has been exposed as strategy-lite.
Conclusion: Balancing Ends, Ways and Means?
We want to conclude by considering further this question of the relationship between the SDSR and the UK's strategically central relationship with the US. Hidden in the detail of the NSS, and in contrast to Prime Minister David Cameron's public rejection of "this thesis of decline", lies the recognition that Britain's world role may be unavoidably changing and that while Britain may continue to work hard to punch above its weight, this may merely mitigate some of the effects of this change rather than prevent their occurrence, echoing a debate that has existed within British defence circles since 1946. In his 2010 Lord Mayor's Banquet speech, Cameron had explained Britain's national strengths by reference to the fact that:
We sit at the heart of the world's most powerful institutions, from the G8 and the G20, this powerful combination of assets, and even fewer have the ability to make the best use of them.
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At the same time, the NSS explained that:
The world of 2030 will be increasingly multipolar, with power distributed more widely than in the last two decades. The circle of international decision-making will be wider and potentially more multilateral. We are already seeing new systems of influence develop where countries share interests and goals which are outside the traditional international architecture.
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The G8 had evolved into the G20, the rise of China, India, and Brazil raised a series of issues for the UK, the EU continued to evolve, and the UN Security Council faced calls for reform increasingly difficult to ignore on rational grounds. Such changes to the international order, coupled with another one -unstated in the NSS or SDSR -the relative decline of American power, meant that the SDSR represented an opportunity for sustained strategic thought to be given to Britain's role in the world at an appropriate moment. As Julian Lindley-French told the PASC:
For the last 50 or 60 years, our penchant for balancing others has tended to lead us to seek common ground between the American worldview and the French-European view, to put it bluntly, but those pillars are changing. Those assumptions that we've had for 50 or 60 years about where our best national effort should be made to achieve the most likely security for our citizens are themselves in question. Right now, I would put the question as being, how does the United Kingdom cope with the relative American decline? We handed over from British power dominating the system to American power dominating the system. Now, the Americans do not dominate the system as they did.
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He also pointed to the reality that; "we're no longer the ally of first resort that we once were because of performance in Iraq and Afghanistan, and that because of our position financially, we may have to say no for other reasons." 75 However, the NSS, and hence the SDSR, does not address this reality. The NSS reaffirms the relationship with the US as the UK's most 76 In the SDSR "our pre-eminent defence and security relationship with the US" is listed as the first of the "five priorities for our international engagement that we have identified as essential to our future security." 77 This helps explain the government's role in Libya in 2011. As with the previous Labour government, the logic here is that the coalition government will have to work increasingly hard to prove its ongoing value to the US and maintain the 'special relationship' with the US. In the past the special relationship has, to a significant extent, been demonstrated by the country's ability and willingness to deploy force in pursuit of goals essentially defined in Washington (this has been true since the time of the 1950 Korean intervention and associated rearmament programme). 78 However, it now pursues this goal as a country with no aircraft carrier capability, a decision of symbolic and as well as military significance, and one that does not seem particularly strategic if a key goal is the maintenance of influence through a key role in NATO and propping up notions of an ongoing special relationship with the US. 81 In this respect, the SDSR was less a review and more a reaffirmation of an approach that locks Britain into a pattern of behaviour. In this sense, the SDSR might be seen as merely the latest indication that the Acheson dilemma, of defining a post-empire international role, continues to haunt UK defence policymakers.
This also helps explain why, despite the NSS and SDSR articulating a vision of a shift to conflict prevention (typified by the July 2011 cross-department initiative called Building Stability Overseas Strategy) 82 , there remains such a strong emphasis on conventional military capabilities. Given the emphasis on conflict prevention in the NSS it might well be asked why the UK needs a carrier capability at all, let alone a continuous carrier strike capability. In effect, the inclusion of the need to counter an "international military crisis between states that draws in Britain, its allies and other state and non-state actors" as the last of the Tier One risks in the NSS is necessary, as it reflects the lead role Britain seeks to retain in NATO and in EU foreign and defence policy-making, as well as its need to continue to attempt to prove itself a reliable ally to the US. In practice, this is likely to retain a greater prominence than the NSS suggests. However, it does undermine any notion that conflict prevention is likely to come to define Britain's grand strategy in the coming years. 83 Moreover, the trade-off between long-term defence requirements and short-term economic priorities inevitably results in a strategic disjuncture. As James Arbuthnot noted; "the thrust of [the SDSR] seems to be that we shall be gambling our security in the short term in exchange for its enhancement in the longer term. That is preferable to the reverse, provided that we always have at the front of our minds the need not to fail in Afghanistan." 84 Hence, while the SDSR was presented as an innovative recasting of defence policy its continuities are its most significant characteristic.
Through it the iterative recasting of British defence continues on, with only its bureaucratic underpinnings being subject to radical review. It represents a missed opportunity for a genuinely strategic approach to British defence and security. 
